

FOIAB3C

P.L. 86-36

3 October 1962

## BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: NRP

1. The satellite portion of the NRP consists of 5 photographic [ ] projects listed below. The aircraft program involves 1 photographic (U-2 - IDEALIST) [ ] project in operation and the OXCART system under development. In addition there are 2 drone projects - [ ] and OXCART/TAGBOARD.

Satellite Reconnaissance Program

<u>Project</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Timing</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
CORONA-M	CIA	Photo-Survey	App. 13' resolution	Present	Proven reliable
CORONA-M I mod.	CIA	Photo-Survey	Dual capsule recovery	Apr. '62	Relatively straight-forward
201	AF	Photo-Survey	App. 10' resolution	Near future	No success to date
LANYARD	AF-CIA	Photo-Tech. Intelligence	6' resolution	Mar. '62 (may slip)	Interim marginal tech. intell. system
[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
F-35	AF	Weather	Real time cloud cover	Present	Useful for programming photo systems

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2. Within the satellite program the most controversial item involves the continuation of the 201 program. The 201 should give slightly higher resolution, approximately in the ratio of 10' as compared with 13'. A COMOR-NPIC study of resolution required to cover priority targets indicates that this degree of improvement is probably of marginal value in that the present CORONA-M system is quite satisfactory for all survey purposes and neither system adequate for technical intelligence. The 201 system is capable of carrying twice the film footage of the present M so that in spite of the greater cost of the 201, it should be slightly cheaper on a dollar per square mile basis  per successful launch. However, the CORONA-M system is of proven reliability and even assuming quite optimistic learning curves for the 201 which has not had a success to date, it is unlikely that any economy could result from the 201 system until after 1965. The development of the J version of the CORONA-M system would double the film capacity and provide the very attractive feature of dual capsule return so that it is clearly superior to the 201 on every count other than the marginal difference in theoretical resolution.

3. In view of these factors, it is universally agreed that no long-term commitments should be made for the 201, and the only question that remains is whether the 201 should be cancelled out-right or whether a few of the systems which have already been procured (3 to 5) should be fired in order to determine how useful the system is and recoup some of the funds that have already been sunk into this program. If a decision is made to fire 3 and cancel the rest of the program now, this would involve the expenditure of . However, if the decision on cancellation of the remaining 2 were held up until after the third firing, then the net cost would be . If the entire program was cancelled out-right, then  would be saved. It is my understanding that the technical gain from determining the effectiveness of the 201 camera system is somewhat marginal since it does not have much application to other systems under development. In view of this, I would recommend that the 201 be cancelled out-right and that the funds saved be put into other programs which have greater potential value. At the very most I believe that 3 additional flights should be authorized with the understanding that the decision to proceed would be reconsidered after each 201 launch.

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[redacted]  
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4. The other major question in the satellite program revolves on the desirability of continuing with LANYARD. This is an interim system designed to give 5' to 6' resolution with the object of having some capability for technical intelligence [redacted]

[redacted] While the LANYARD system is on the borderline of providing technical intelligence material even theoretically and while it is quite a complicated system, I believe on balance one should proceed with this program since there is a definite possibility of [redacted] and the experience of operating LANYARD might be of value [redacted]

6. The three aircraft systems are all under CIA management, and I believe on the whole non-controversial. Development-wise the main effort in the IDEALIST program is [redacted]

[redacted] The only major problem relative to the OXCART program involves the surfacing of the RB-X (Tab A) and the extraordinarily difficult problem of developing penetration techniques which will assure the safety and hopefully the lack of detection of the aircraft, thereby permitting a political decision to proceed with the overflight of Soviet territory.

7. The [redacted] drone project is being seriously studied for use in Cuba. At the present time it appears that photographic [redacted]

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missions are not warranted but that the vehicle offers great potential for obtaining critical intelligence on the details of operation of SAM systems and possibly MIG-21's. The development of a quarter-scale OXCART drone is, in my opinion, very controversial. An evaluation of the proposal is attached hereto as Tab B. I would recommend that only the initial study and model phase be approved at this time and that the whole program be reconsidered when this has been completed.

8. In addition to the specific collection systems, the NRO is responsible for processing the take. An arrangement has been worked out whereby the AF and CIA facilities  will be combined under CIA management and up-dated to process initially all of the high-quality material and prepare dupes for NPIC-community use. Additional large-scale production of dupes for other customers will be carried out by the AF facility at Westover. The CIA part of this effort is carried as a line item in its part of the NRO program and is reasonable in light of the anticipated requirements. NSA has the prime responsibility for analysis of the SIGINT take, but SAC is doing a fair share of this with NSA's concurrence. CIA has participated by providing technical guidance and assistance.

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Signed: Herbert Scoville, Jr.,

**HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.**  
Deputy Director  
(Research)

Attachments: (2)



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